From Doenitz's IMT testimony: Immediately after 30 January 1933, I believe it was on 1 February, I went on leave to the Dutch East Indies and Ceylon, a trip which lasted well into the summer of 1933. This leave journey had been granted me, at Grossadmiral Raeder's recommendation, by President Hindenburg.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: In the autumn of 1934 I went as captain of the cruiser Emden through the Atlantic, around Africa into the Indian Ocean, and back... I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time when, in the presence of Grossadmiral Raeder in the autumn of 1934, I informed him of my departure for foreign parts as captain of the cruiser Emden. I saw him again on the day following my return with the Emden. From the autumn of 1934 until the outbreak of war in 1939, in 5 years, I saw him four times in all, including the two occasions when I reported to him as already mentioned...

One was a military matter when he was watching a review of the fleet in the Baltic Sea and I stood next to him on the bridge of the flagship in order to give the necessary explanations while two U-boats showed attack maneuvers. The other occasion was an invitation to all high-ranking army and navy officers when the new Reich Chancellery in the Voss Strasse was completed. That was in 1938 or 1939. I saw him there but I did not speak with him... In the years between 1939 and 1943 I saw the Fuehrer four times, each time when short military reports about U-boat warfare were being made and always in the presence of large groups.

From Doenitz's US SBS Team interview: After the summer of 1935, that is after the London Naval Agreement, our Navy started building different vessels of the types permitted, including U-boats. As far as I can remember, we had about forty-eight U-boats at the beginning of the war. I am not entirely sure of this number, because I am quoting from memory. It is the number of submarines which were the potential operational fleet. The number that actually went into combat was, during the first months of the war, so small that in some months we had only two, three, or five submarines simultaneously in the combat zone...

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: On 27 September 1935 I became the commanding officer of the U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, the first German U-boat flotilla after 1918. As an introduction to taking up that command, that is, in September 1935, I spent a few days in Turkey, in order to go there in a U-boat and to bridge the gap from 1918... (from 1918 to 1935 I had) nothing at all (to do with U-boats)...

The U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, of which I became the commanding officer, consisted of three small boats of 250 tons each, the so-called "Einbaume." Besides, there were six somewhat smaller boats which were in a U-boat school, which was not under my command, for the purpose of training. Then there were afloat and in service perhaps another six of these small boats... I merely received the order to fill in that gap from 1918, to train the U-boats for the first time in cruising, submersion, and firing... I instructed the commanders as to how they should behave if they stopped a merchantman and I also issued an appropriate tactical order for each commander.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: I had the mission of developing the U-boat service as well as possible, as it is the duty of every front-line officer of all armed forces of all nations, in order to be prepared against all war emergencies. Once, in the year 1937 or 1938, in the mobilization plan of the Navy, my order read that, in case France should try to interrupt the rearmament by an attack on Germany, it would be the task of the German U-boats to attack the transports in the Mediterranean which would leave North Africa for France. I then carried out maneuvers in the North Sea with this task in mind. If you are asking me about a definite aim or line of action, that, so far as I remember, was the only mission which I received in that respect from the Naval Operations Staff. That occurred in the year 1936 or 1937. According to my recollection, that plan had been issued lest the rearmament of Germany, at that time unarmed, might be interrupted by some measure or other.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: The only instruction which I gave concerning the war against merchantmen was an instruction on how the U-boat should behave in the stopping and examining, the establishing of the destination and so on, of a merchantman. Later, I believe in the year 1938, when the draft of the German Prize Regulations came, I passed this on to the flotillas for the instruction of the commanders.

From Doenitz's interview by the US SBS Team: ...With the beginning of the war, a U-boat program was formulated. According to this plan, we wanted to build fifteen to twenty a month, which should later have been increased to twenty or twenty-five. We did not reach that number (15-20 a month) until 1942. It took a long time to build these U-boats and to train the crews for them... In general, the ratio is such that, of the submarines available, one half will be in the docks and the other half on the sea. Out of the latter ones, again, one-half will be in the combat zone, and the other half on their way to and from the combat zone. We had about two to eight in the combat zone all through 1940.

I can best illustrate this by a story which was being told at that time. I had under my command two brothers, both U-boat officers, each one serving on a different U-boat. It so happened that those were the only U-boats at sea at that time, and people would say: 'The brothers "so-and-so" alone are winning the war for Germany.' This story illustrates how small the number was, because the Navy was in the process of building up.

In 1941, we managed to get eight, twelve, fifteen, or perhaps a maximum of twenty submarines simultaneously in the zone of operation. In 1942, this increased from that to some thirty-five to fifty-five, and in the winter of 1942-43, we had perhaps seventy to eighty submarines simultaneously in the zone of operations. You will understand that these are only approximate figures. We had then reached a climax in the submarine warfare in March or April 1943. At that time, we suffered a very sharp reverse, from which we never again recovered. That was caused by the Anglo-American Air Force, with its improved radio location equipment. From then on, the submarines on the surface were detected and your planes could both fight them and notify and divert their convoy...

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: Grossadmiral Raeder embarked in the middle of July 1939 for submarine maneuvers of my fleet in the Baltic Sea... All submarines which had completed their tests, I had assembled in the Baltic. I cannot remember the exact figure, but I think there were about 30. In the maneuvers, I then showed Grossadmiral Raeder what these submarines could accomplish...in addition there were the smaller submarines of lower tonnage, which could operate only as far as the North Sea...

At that time we had not even 15 submarines capable of navigating in the Atlantic. At the outbreak of war, as far as I remember, we went to sea with fifteen submarines capable of navigating in the Atlantic... Grossadmiral Raeder told me—and he repeated this to the entire officers' corps during his final speech in Swinemunde—that the Fuehrer had informed him that, under no circumstances, must a war in the West develop, for that would be Finis Germaniae. I asked for leave; and immediately after the maneuvers, I went on leave on 24 July for a 6-weeks' rest at Bad Gastein. I am merely stating that because it shows how we regarded the situation at that time... I was called back by telephone in the middle of August.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: The German U-boat service, in the fall of 1939, consisted of about thirty to forty operational boats. That meant that at any time about one-third could be used for operations. In view of the harsh reality the situation seemed much worse later. There was one month, for instance, when we had only two boats out at sea. With this small number of U-boats, it was, of course, only possible to give pinpricks to a great naval power such as England.

That we were not prepared for war against England in the Navy, is, in my opinion, best and most clearly to be seen from the fact that the armament of the Navy had to be radically changed at the beginning of the war. It had been the intention to create a homogeneous fleet which, of course, since it was in proportion much smaller than the British fleet, was not capable of waging a war against England. This program for building a homogeneous fleet had to be discontinued when the war with England started; only these large ships which were close to completion were finished. Everything else was abandoned or scrapped. That was necessary in order to free the building capacity for building U-boats. And that, also, explains why the German U-boat war, in this last war, actually only started in the year 1942, that is to say, when the U-boats which had been ordered for building at the beginning of the war were ready for action.

Since peacetime, that is in 1940, the replacement of U-boats hardly covered the losses... The U-boat has, of course, the assignment of approaching an enemy and attacking him with torpedoes. Therefore, in that respect, the U-boat is an aggressive weapon... Aggressive or defensive war is a political decision and, therefore, it has nothing to do with military considerations. I can certainly use a U-boat in a defensive war because, in defensive war also, the enemy's ships must be attacked. Of course, I can use a U-boat in exactly the same way in a politically aggressive war. If one should conclude that the navies which have U-boats are planning an aggressive war, then all nations—for all the navies of these nations had U-boats, in fact many had more than Germany, twice and three times as many—planned aggressive war...

I received information on plans from the Naval Operations Staff only after these plans had been completed; that is to say, only if I was to participate in some way in the carrying out of a plan, and then only at a time necessary for the prompt execution of my military task.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: At that time I could attack without warning all ships which were guarded either by naval vessels or which were under air cover. Furthermore, I was permitted to exercise armed force against any ship which, when stopped, sent radio messages, or resisted the order to stop, or did not obey the order to stop... I knew that the Naval Operations Staff intended, according to events, according to the development of the enemy's tactics, to retaliate blow for blow, as it says or said in the order, by intensified action...

Right at the beginning of the war it was our experience that all merchantmen not only took advantage of their radio installations when an attempt was made to stop them, but that they immediately sent messages as soon as they saw any U-boat on the horizon. It was absolutely clear, therefore, that all merchantmen were co-operating in the military intelligence service. Furthermore, only a few days after the beginning of the war we found out that merchantmen were armed and made use of their weapons.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: I have already stated that that was a mistake; the Athenia was taken for an auxiliary cruiser. The sinking of an auxiliary cruiser without warning is legal. I have also stated already that on a thorough examination of the case, I have found that the commander should have been more cautious and that is why he was punished...

If a merchant ship acts like a merchant ship, it is treated as such. If it does not, then the submarine must proceed to attack. That is legal, and in accordance with international law. The same thing happened to the crews of German merchant ships...if a merchant ship is sunk legally, that is just war, and there is suffering in other places, too, during the war... Men are killed during wars and no one is proud of it...It is a necessity, the harsh necessity of war.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: ...it is a memorandum from the Chief of the Operations Department to the Secretary of State, that is to say, a negotiation between Berlin and the Foreign Office; and the front-line commander, whose station was on the coast and who, for all practical purposes, was in charge of the U-boats, had nothing to do with it. I do not know this letter... I was not informed about this letter... I knew that the view of the Naval High Command was to follow the measures of the enemy step by step. I knew that... I did not know of this letter; and I do not know if that is Herr Raeder's view. I do not know... In the West we wanted to avoid any further complications, and we endeavored as long as possible to fight according to the London Agreement. That can be seen from all the directives that the U-boats received.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: A plan for the war against England did not exist at all before the beginning of the war. Such a war seemed to us outside the realm of possibility. Considering the overwhelming superiority of the British fleet, which can hardly be expressed in proportionate figures, and considering England's strategical domination of the seas such a war appeared to us to be absolutely hopeless. The only means by which Britain could have been damaged effectively was by submarine warfare; but even the submarine weapon was by no means being given preferential treatment nor was its production accelerated. It was merely given its corresponding place in the creation of a well-balanced homogeneous fleet.

At the beginning of the war, all we had were 40 submarines ready for action, of which, as far as I can remember, barely half could have been used in the Atlantic. That, in comparison with the earthgirdling naval means at the disposal of the first-ranking world power England, is as good as nothing. As a comparison, I should like to cite the fact that both the British and the French Navy at the same time had more than 100 submarines each... Captain Doenitz at that time was a subordinate frontline commander, under the command of the chief of the fleet and he, because of his warfare experience, had the task of training and tactically guiding the inexperienced submarine personnel.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: The Naval Operations Staff thought that Great Britain would probably start in where she had stopped at the end of the first World War. That meant that there would be a hunger blockade against Germany, a control of the merchandise of neutral countries, introduction of a system of control, the arming of merchant ships, and the delimitation of operational waters...

At the beginning of the war we were forced to improvise a great many orders we were issuing, because they were not prepared thoroughly... After consultation with the Foreign Office, we had decided that we would strictly adhere to the London Agreement until we had clear-cut evidence of the British merchant navy being used for military purposes. We remembered from the last war the power which the enemy propaganda had, and we did not under any circumstances want to give anyone cause once more to decry us as pirates.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: It is a matter of course that if a ship has a gun on board she will use it. It would have been a one-sided obligation if the submarine, in a suicidal way, were then to wait until the other ship fired the first shot. That is a reciprocal agreement, and one cannot in any circumstances expect the submarine to wait until it gets hit first. And, as I said before, in practice the steamers used their guns as soon as they came within range...

I am not an expert on international law. I am soldier; and I acted according to my military orders. Of course, it is suicide for a submarine to wait till it receives the first hit. It goes without saying that the steamer is not carrying guns for fun, but to make use of them. And I have already explained what use was made of them...

It is generally laid down by international law that a merchant ship can be fired on if it makes use of its wireless when stopped. That is also in the French Ordinance, for instance. In order to avoid more severe measures we had not, as a rule, done so yet. Not until the end of September, when I received a definite order or permission to do so, was that rule, which is in accordance with international law, put into effect. ...according to the International Conference on International Law - I happen to know this because it appeared as a footnote in the Prize Ordinance - according to this conference of 1923, they were not allowed to use wireless when being stopped. That is international law and is found in all instructions. I know for certain that the French instructions say this too.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: No, it was not faked, but there was a clear order that the case of the Athenia should be kept secret for political reasons and, as a result, the log had to be changed... Probably Captain Lemp received the order either from me or my staff: "The case is to be kept secret." And following that, he or the flotilla took the log, which went to ten different departments of the Navy, and altered it. What else could he do? He could not do otherwise...

Either it was done by my order or, if it had not been done, then I would have ordered it, because the political instructions existed that "it must be kept secret." The fighting men had no other choice, therefore, but to alter the log. The U-boat commanders never received the order to make a false entry, but in the particular case of the Athenia, where it was ordered afterwards that it must be kept secret, it was not noted in the log... The soldier had nothing to do with politics; but, on the other hand, he naturally had to stand by his country during the war.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: In the first months of the war I had very bitter experiences. I suffered very great losses in sea areas far removed from any coast; and as very soon I had information through the Geneva Red Cross that many members of crews had been rescued, it was clear that these U-boats had been lost above the water. If they had been lost below the water the survival of so many members of the crews would have been impossible.

I also had reports that there had been very unselfish deeds of rescue, quite justifiable from a humane angle, but militarily very dangerous for the U-boat. So now, of course, since I did not want to fight on the open sea but close to the harbors or in the coastal approaches to the harbors, I had to warn the U-boats of the great dangers, in fact of suicide. And, to state a parallel, English U-boats in the Jutland waters, areas which we dominated, showed, as a matter of course and quite correctly, no concern at all for those who were shipwrecked, even though, without a doubt, our defense was only a fraction of the British.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: Each depth charge attack against a submarine is definitely and absolutely an offensive action; for the submarine submerges and is harmless under water, while the surface vessel which wants to carry out the depth charge attack approaches as closely as possible to the position where it assumes the U-boat to be, in order to drop the depth charge as accurately as possible on top of the U-boat. A destroyer, that is, a warship, does not attack a submarine in any different way...

Neutral merchantmen, according to the political orders, the orders of the Naval Operations Staff, were only attacked without warning when they were found in operational zones which had been definitely designated as such, or naturally only when they did not act as neutrals should, but like ships which were participating in the war.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: If a merchant ship sails without lights, it must run the risk of being taken for a warship, because at night it is not possible to distinguish between a merchant ship and a warship. At the time the order was issued, it concerned an operational area in which blacked-out troop transports were traveling from England to France... I was not asked before Germany signed this Treaty; Germany adhered to the Treaty in practice, as I know very well, until countermeasures were introduced; and then I received orders to act accordingly. ...the paper you are showing me is a note or memorandum made by a young official on the Naval Operations Staff. In fact-it was the idea of that particular officer on the Naval Operations Staff; and as I have pointed out here, I did not know of the matter—in actual fact, the Naval Operations Staff never gave me such an order. The contents of that paper are fiction...

That was this young officer's idea. The order which I received from the Naval Operations Staff stated explicitly that blacked-out vessels could be sunk in this area where English transports were traveling from England to France. So, you see, it contained none of the things stated in this memorandum. There is no doubt that the section chief, and likewise the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, refused and rejected that entirely impossible idea and gave me that short and explicit order... That is a note submitted by the official on the Naval Operations Staff, of which his superiors on the Naval Operations Staff did not approve. It was corrected. There was no unspoken agreement but an explicit and clear order to myself; so that young officer's idea had already been turned down by the Naval Operations Staff itself...

No order for that has ever been given. The order of the Naval Operations Staff issued to me in that connection has been submitted and that is a clear and concise order, without the things mentioned here... the clear, concise order was given by the Naval Operations Staff to me in which these things were not mentioned. And quite as clearly I passed my orders on. That is how it is. This memorandum, or these ideas of that officer, was already disapproved by his chief of department in Berlin. A clear order was given to me, however, and there was nothing in it about a War Diary and all these things mentioned here. That order is available.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: They first brought about the order that merchantmen which sent radio messages on being stopped could be attacked without warning. They also brought about the order that merchantmen whose armament had been recognized beyond doubt, that is, whose armament one knew from British publication, could be attacked without warning...

I believe that the Naval Operations Staff decided on this order on the basis of the British publication which said that now the arming of merchantmen was completed. In addition, there was a broadcast by the British Admiralty on 1 October to the effect that the merchantmen had been directed to ram German U-boats and furthermore...it was clear beyond doubt that every merchantman was part of the intelligence service of the enemy, and its radio messages at sight of a U-boat determined the use of surface or air forces...

I had received quite a number of reports in this connection, and since the German measures were always taken about 4 weeks after it had been recognized that the enemy employed these tactics, I had very serious losses in the meantime-in the period when I still had to keep to the one-sided and, for me, dangerous obligations.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: The fact that enemy merchant vessels were armed became clear after a few weeks of the war. We had a large number of reports about artillery fights which had occurred between U-boats and armed enemy merchant ships. Certainly one, and probably several boats were lost by us. One British steamer, I think it was called Stonepool, was praised publicly by the British Admiralty for its success in combating submarines...

They were due to an order from the Fuehrer. At the beginning of the war he had stated that Germany did not have any intention of waging war against women and children. He wished, for that reason, that also in naval war any incidents in which women and children might lose their lives should be avoided. Consequently, even the stopping of passenger ships was prohibited. The military necessities of naval warfare made it very difficult to adhere to this order, particularly where passenger ships were traveling in enemy convoys. Later on, step by step, this order was altered as it became evident that there was no longer any peaceful passenger traffic at all, and that enemy passenger ships were particularly heavily armed and used more and more as auxiliary cruisers and troop transport ships...

Neither side made its war measures known during the war, and that held true in this case also. But, in October, the German press left no doubt whatsoever that every armed enemy merchant ship would be sunk by us without warning, and later on it was equally well known that we were forced to consider the entire enemy merchant marine as being under military direction and in military use. These statements by our press must no doubt have been known to the British Admiralty and the neutral governments. Apart from that, and I think this was in October, Grossadmiral Raeder gave an interview to the press on the same theme.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: I did not protest against them (the orders above). On the contrary, I considered them justified, because, as I said before, otherwise I would have had to remain bound to an obligation which was one-sided and meant serious losses for me... This development, as I have said before, was entirely forced. If merchantmen are armed and make use of their arms, and if they send messages which summon protection, they force the U-boat to submerge and attack without warning. That same forced development, in the areas which we patrolled, was also the case with the British submarines, and applied in exactly the same way to American and Russian submarines...

In an ocean area where there is no constant patrolling by the enemy, by naval forces of any kind or by aircraft, as along the coast, the submarine has the advantage. But in all other areas the ship acquires the main attack weapons against a submarine, and the submarine is therefore compelled to treat that ship as a battleship, which means that it is forced to submerge and loses its speed. Therefore, in all ocean areas, with the exception of coastal waters which can be constantly controlled, the advantage of arms lies with the merchantman...

They remained absolutely within the bounds of what was necessary. I have explained already that the resulting steps were always taken gradually and after very careful study by the Naval Operations Staff. This very careful study may also have been motivated by the fact that, for political reasons, any unnecessary intensification in the West was to be avoided. ...there is not only a (British) directive to send wireless signals if the ship is stopped by a U-boat; that alone would, according to international law, justify the U-boat in employing armed force against the ship; but beyond that, it is stated that as soon as an enemy ship is in sight, this signal is to be transmitted in order that the naval forces may attack in time.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: I think on 4 November, the United States of America declared the so-called American combat zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone actual belligerent actions rendered the sea dangerous for American shipping. By this announcement, some of the points of that memorandum were in immediate need of being revised. As a rule we remained within the limits of the measures as they had been employed by both parties during the first World War.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: ...operational areas around the enemy are admissible. I may repeat that I am not a specialist in international law but a soldier, and I judge according to common sense. It seems to me a matter of course that an ocean area or an ocean zone around England could not be left in the undisturbed possession of the enemy. ...there are plenty of British statements which declare that in wartime—and we were at war with England—one cannot permit neutrals to enter and give aid to the belligerents, especially if they had previously been warned against doing so. That is quite in accordance with international law...

I have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to cross the combat zones. If they entered the combat zones, they had to run the risk of suffering damage, or else stay away. That is what war is. For instance, no consideration would be shown on land either, to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition or supplies to the enemy. It would be fired on in exactly the same way as an enemy transport. It is, therefore, quite admissible to turn the seas around the enemy's country into a combat area. That is the position as I know it in international law, although I am only a soldier...

Strict neutrality would require the avoidance of combat areas. Whoever enters a combat area must take the consequences... And for that reason, the United States explicitly prohibited entry into these zones in November, because it refused to enter the combat zone... Special lanes were left open for the neutrals. They did not have to enter the combat area unless they were going to England. Then they had to run the risk of war.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: Well, the submarine commander in this case could not see, first of all, that the ship was traveling from one neutral port to the other... But that ship was heading for England, and he confused it with an English ship. That is why he torpedoed it. I know of that case... If one or two instances of mistakes are found in the course of 5 1/2 years of clean submarine warfare, it proves nothing.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: Germany had sent a note to the neutrals on 24 November 1939, warning them against using these lanes and advising neutrals to use the methods of the United States, whereby American ships, in order to avoid any incidents, had been forbidden to enter the waters around England. ...these ocean areas were clearly limited areas in which hostilities took place continuously on both sides. The neutrals had been warned expressly against using these areas. If they entered this war area, they had to run the risk of being damaged. England proceeded likewise in its operational areas in our waters...

During a war, there is no basic obligation to inform the enemy with what means one does one's fighting. In other words, this is not a question of legality, but a question of military or political expediency. England, in her operational areas, did not inform us either as to the means of fighting she uses or did use; and I know how many headaches this caused me when I was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, later, in endeavoring to employ economically the small means we had. That is the principle. At that time when, as Commander of U-boats, I received this order to simulate mine hits where possible, I considered this as militarily expedient, because the counterintelligence were left in doubt as to whether mine sweepers or U-boat defense means were to be employed.

In other words, it was a military advantage for the nation conducting the war, and today I am of the opinion that political reasons also may have influenced this decision, with the object of avoiding complications with neutral countries... During the first World War we had experienced what part is played by propaganda. Therefore I think it possible that our Government, our political leaders, for this reason, too, may have issued this order.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: According to my recollection, I issued this order at the end of November or the beginning of December 1939, for the following reasons: I had only a handful of U-boats a month at my disposal. In order that this small force might prove effective at all, I had to send the boats close to the English coast, in front of the ports. In addition, the magnetic mine showed itself to be a very valuable weapon of war. Therefore, I equipped these boats both with mines and torpedoes and directed them, after laying the mines, to operate in waters close to the coast, immediately outside the ports. There they fought in constant and close combat and under the surveillance of naval and air patrols. Each U-boat which was sighted or reported there was hunted by U-boat-chasing units and by air patrols ordered to the scene.

The U-boats themselves, almost without exception or entirely, had as their objectives only ships which were protected or accompanied by some form of protection. Therefore, it would have been suicide for the U-boat, in a position of that sort, to come to the surface and to rescue. The commanders were all very young; I was the only one who had service experience from the first World War. And I had to tell them this very forcibly and drastically because it was hard for a young commander to judge a situation as well as I could... For the U-boats which, according to my memory, went out into the Atlantic again only after the Norwegian campaign, for these U-boats the general order of rescue applied; and this order was qualified only in one way, namely that no rescue was to be attempted if the safety of a U-boat did not permit it. The facts show that the U-boats acted in this light.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: That was probably why the Naval Operations Staff gave the order, because of the Greek fleet sailing in England's service. I assumed that those were the reasons of the Naval Operations Staff... It says here that they were to be treated like enemy ships... These are matters connected with the political leadership and I know nothing about them. I myself, as Commander of U-boats, looked at them only from the angle of military advantage or expediency, just as England did in similar cases. What the political reasons may have been, I cannot say...

There were certain areas which neutrals had been warned not to cross. I stated yesterday that the same procedure was followed in English operational areas. If a neutral, in spite of these warnings, entered those areas where military actions were constantly being carried on by one side or the other, it had to run the risk of suffering damage. Those are the reasons which induced the Naval Operations Staff to issue these orders.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: ...that was a question not of legality but of military expediency. For military reasons I cannot give the enemy explicit information as to the means of combat I am using in an area which may be mined. You operated in the same way. I remind you of the French danger zone which was declared, corresponding to the mined areas around Italy. You did not state which weapons you were using, either. That has nothing to do with legality. That is purely a question of military expediency...

It is not true that we tried to fool the neutrals. We warned the neutrals explicitly that combat actions were going on in these operational areas and that if they entered they would suffer damage. We pretended nothing; we told them explicitly: "Do not enter these zones." England did the same. ...we did not fool them because we warned them beforehand. In wartime I do not have to say what weapon I intend to use; I may very well camouflage my weapon. But the neutrals were not fooled. On the contrary, they were told, "Do not enter these zones." After that, the question of which particular military method I use in these areas no longer concerns the neutrals...

In operational areas I am obliged to take care of the survivors after the engagement, if the military situation permits. The same held good in the Baltic and in many operational areas... I have stated that I was obliged to take care of the survivors after the engagement, if the military situation permitted. That forms part of the Geneva Convention, or the agreement on its application. ...outside the zone, neutrals were treated according to the Prize Ordinance, only inside the zone they were not... The difference was that neutrals outside the zone were treated according to the Prize Ordinance. According to the London Agreement, we were obliged, before sinking the ship, to see that the crew were safe and within reach of land. There was no obligation to do so inside the zone. In that case, we acted according to the Hague Agreement for the application of the Geneva Convention, which provides that the survivors should be taken care of, after the fight, if the military situation permits. ...the attacks on survivors were contrary to a soldier's idea of fair fighting; and that I have never put my name to any order which could in the slightest degree lead to anything of the kind—not even when it was proposed to me as a reprisal measure...

As I know my U-boat forces, there would have been a storm of indignation against such an order. The clean and honest idealism of these would never have allowed them to do it; and I would never have given such an order or permitted it to be given. ...we were thinking of an area in the immediate vicinity of the permanent positions. Enemy defenses off the harbors on the British coast. The London Agreement has nothing to do with fighting ships under escort. Those are two entirely different things; and that order applied to this area and the combating of ships under escort.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: On 5 March 1940 I was called from Wilhelmshaven, where I had my command, to Berlin, to the Naval Operations Staff, and at that meeting I was instructed on the plan (for the Norway action) and on my task... had neither the opportunity nor indeed the authority to do that. I should like to ask what soldier of what nation, who receives any military task whatsoever, has the right to approach his general staff and ask for examination or justification as to whether an aggressive war can evolve from this task... I received military orders as a soldier, and my purpose naturally was to carry out these military tasks. Whether the leadership of the State was thereby politically waging an aggressive war or not, or whether they were protective measures, was not for me to decide; it was none of my business.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: It (the order above) means that all German ships by day and by night in this area were to be sunk without warning... With certainty (it was in effect) from 8 April 1940, but I believe I recall that even on 7 April this practice was already in existence. ...the first declaration of danger zone for this area took place on 12 April 1940.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: I had the commanders of submarines report verbally to me every time. The logs, which arrived, or were finished several weeks later, or some time after the entries were made, since they had to be written in the port, were only submitted to me by my Chief of Staff if they contained something special in addition to the verbal report...

I know that (the Sheaf Mead was not sailing in convoy). And I know that she was an armed ship and that, according to the orders which the commander had, he was justified in sinking her as an armed ship. It also appears from his log that he could not decide on firing the torpedo until he had ascertained that the ship was armed. That is very clearly expressed here... I did tell him that if he was on the spot where this rescue went on he should also have helped.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: One must distinguish very clearly here between the question of rescue or non-rescue, and that is a question of military possibility. During a war the necessity of refraining from rescue may well arise. For example, if your own ship is endangered thereby, it would be wrong from a military viewpoint and, besides, would not be of value for the one to be rescued; and no commander of any nation is expected to rescue if his own ship is thereby endangered. The British Navy correctly take up a very clear, unequivocal position in this respect: that rescue is to be denied in such cases; and that is evident also from their actions and commands. That is one point...

There may of course be other reasons. For instance it is clear that, in war, the mission to be accomplished is of first importance. No one will start to rescue, for example, if after subduing one opponent there is another on the scene. Then, as a matter of course, the combating of the second opponent is more important than the rescue of those who have already lost their ship.

The other question is concerned with attacking the shipwrecked...Shipwrecked persons are members of the crew who, after the sinking of their ship, are not able to fight any longer, and are either in lifeboats or other means of rescue or in the water... Firing upon these men is a matter concerned with the ethics of war and should be rejected under any and all circumstances. In the German Navy and U-boat force this principle, according to my firm conviction, has never been violated, with the one exception of the affair Eck. No order on this subject has ever been issued, in any form whatsoever.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: That means therefore that as soon as the ship sights a U-boat, which during war must be assumed to be there for a reason to effect a capture-the ship will, in its own defense, open fire as soon as it comes within range; that is when the submarine has come within range of its guns. The ship, in using its guns for an offensive action, can act in no other way.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: ...up to that time we confined ourselves to the area...near the British Coast, whereas now we considered the entire U.S.A. combat zone as an operational zone. The declaration regarding a blockade was based on the fact that in the meantime France had been eliminated from the war, and that Britain now was the focal point of all belligerent action...

(The German blockade zone) was nearly exactly the same as the USA combat zone. There were merely a few insignificant corrections. ...the practice on the part of the enemy was identical with ours. In the areas controlled by us in the Baltic, in the eastern part of the North Sea' around Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and French waters, the enemy used every suitable weapon without giving previous warning, without notifying us in advance by which means of combat other ships were to be sunk—submarines, mines, aircraft, or surface vessels. In these regions the same thing applied to neutrals, and especially to Sweden.

From Of Arms and Men by Robert L. O'Connell: Germany was decidedly ill equipped to wage war against England. It has been suggested by many, including Manstein, who would have commanded the initial landings, that if the Germans had only invaded England during the autumn of 1940, operation 'Sea Lion' would have stood a good chance of success. But this line of reasoning fails to take sufficient account of continuing British air superiority in the Channel and the truly primitive nature of the armada slated to transport the German invasion force. Rather, it seems clear that an early invasion was not undertaken because it stood little chance of success. Besides, Hitler never had his heart in it.

Yet his alternative was possibly even worse. He would simultaneously seek to wage air war against the British and starve them by unleashing Admiral Doenitz's U-boats against their overseas commerce. Besides having neglected both U-boat and heavy bomber production, and therefore lacking the requisite means for success, there were excellent political reasons why Hitler should have abstained from both. The United States had entered the Great War on the side of the Allies because of unrestricted submarine warfare, and, even considering American neutrality legislation, there was good reason she would do so again.

Also, despite the bombing of Rotterdam, which the Germans claimed was accidental, there were many who continued to hope such attacks on population centers could be curbed. Had the Luftwaffe abstained from bombing the British, it is quite possible that the Royal Air Force would have been reciprocally restrained from using its superior strategic strike force in an all-out assault against German cities. It seems unlikely that the British would have dropped out of the war, but their prime means of hurting Germany would have been blunted. Yet Hitler was Hitler. Calculated acts of moderation were alien to his nature. Therefore, he got the worst of everything.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: The U-boats of all navies had so far operated singly, contrary to all other categories of ships which, by tactical co-operation, tried to get better results. The development of the "wolf pack tactics" was nothing further than breaking with that principle of individual action for each U-boat and attempting to use U-boats exactly in the same manner as other categories of warships, collectively.

Such a method of collective action was naturally necessary when a formation was to be attacked, be it a formation of warships, that is, several warships together, or a convoy. These "wolf pack tactics," therefore, have nothing to do with war against merchantmen according to Prize Regulations. They are a tactical measure to fight formations of ships, and, of course, convoys where procedure according to Prize Regulations cannot be followed.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: This case is doubtless a deception, but I do not remember for what particular reason this deception was carried through.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: In August 1940 Germany had declared this operational area in English waters. US ships were, however, expressly excluded from attack without warning in this operational area because, as I believe, the political leaders wanted to avoid any possibility of an incident with the USA. I said the political leaders. The Prosecution has accused me, in my treatment and attitude, my differing attitude toward the neutrals, of having a masterful agility in adapting myself, that is guided by cynicism and opportunism. It is clear that the attitude of a state toward neutrals is a purely political affair, and that this relation is decided exclusively by the political leadership, particularly in a nation that is at war... As a soldier I had not the slightest influence on the question of how the political leadership believed they had to treat this or that neutral. Regarding this particular case, however, from knowledge of the orders I received through the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff from the political leadership, I should like to say the following: I believe that the political leadership did everything to avoid any incident on the high seas with the United States.

First, I have already stated that the U-boats were actually forbidden even to stop American ships... Second, that the American 300-mile safety zone was recognized without any question by Germany, although according to the existing international law only a three-mile zone was authorized... For instance, I had suggested that mines be laid before Halifax, the British port of Nova Scotia, and before Reykjavik, both bases being important for war ships and merchant shipping, The political leaders, the Fuehrer, rejected this because he wanted to avoid every possibility of friction with the United States. ...when the American destroyers in the summer of 1941 received orders to attack German submarines, that is, before war started, when they were still neutral and I was forbidden to fight back, I was then forced to forbid the submarines in this area to attack even British destroyers, in order to avoid having a submarine mistake an American for a British ship.

From Operation Drumbeat: U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast by M. Gannon: Though, understandably, Japan was now pressing him forward. Adolf Hitler could well have concluded at this point that a formal declaration of war was not necessary. The Japanese actions had had the effect of blunting rather than sharpening the danger of American intervention in Europe. Certainly Hitler could now decline Japan's invitation to wage war against the United States in the same way Japan had declined his suggestion that she attack the Soviets at Vladivostok. He was under no obligation to Japan. The conversation with Matsuoka in April had been only that, a conversation. Why declare and thus cancel out the unexpected great advantage to Germany of the Japanese attack, namely its diversion of American attention from the Atlantic to the Pacific? As for a declaration from the other side, Hitler's embassy in Washington had informed him that Congress, its emotions directed solely at Japan, was in no mood to chose a two-ocean war. It was not too late to cancel the orders given to Admiral Doenitz (to attack American shipping). He had cancelled U-boat orders before. Why should he not wait and examine later developments?

A rational person might have chosen this course. Instead, though for what precise reason still remains unclear, perhaps to guarantee (if any treaty the Axis members ever signed was a guarantee) that Japan would not make a separate peace before victory had been won in Europe; perhaps for vengeance pure and simple against Roosevelt, his false neutrality, and his destroyers; perhaps because, in his view, war with the United States was inevitable anyway, so he might as well seize this moment as, if not ideal, acceptable; perhaps because he saw this action as necessary to get Japan totally committed against his key enemy, England; perhaps because he relished the prospect of huge U-boat successes against US naval vessels and merchant shipping; or perhaps because he agreed with his foreign minister that 'a great power does not allow itself to be declared war on, it declares war itself' - for whatever reason or reasons the Fuehrer signed a revision of the Tripartite Pact that threw Germany into the war on Japan's side and extracted a promise from the Japanese to stay on course... ...It would be argued later by historians that, next to Barbarossa, the 11 December declaration was Hitler's greatest mistake. 'Improvised and unnecessary,' it doomed his war.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: Germany considered the crews of merchantmen as combatants, because they fought with the weapons which had been mounted aboard the merchant ships in large numbers. According to our knowledge one or two men of the Royal Navy were on board for the servicing of these weapons, but where guns were concerned the rest of the gunners were part of the crew of the ship... That (the number of gunners) varied according to the size of the weapon, probably between five and ten. Then, in addition, there were munitions men. The same applied to the servicing of depth charge chutes and depth charge throwers. The members of the crew did, in fact, fight with the weapons like the few soldiers who were on board. It was also a matter of course that the crew was considered as a unit, for in a battleship we cannot distinguish either between the man who is down at the engine in the boiler room and the man who services the gun up on deck...

Of course, every soldier has a right to be rescued if the circumstances of his opponent permit it. But this fact should have an influence upon the right to attack the crew as well...means fought with weapons used for an attack against a ship as part of naval warfare... I first heard about this discussion (above) and its contents when the record of it was submitted here... I received neither a written nor a verbal order. I knew nothing at all about this discussion; I learned about it through the document which I saw here... I did not believe that it would take a long time to train seamen, and that America had no lack of them. Consequently I would also not be of the opinion that this would serve as a deterrent if they had enough men. ...Whether they would be scared off or not is an American matter which I cannot judge.

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: We did think, however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions for naval warfare which would certainly justify and necessitate further development of the laws of naval warfare... I am thinking mainly of two points: First, the large-scale use of the airplane in naval warfare. As a result of the speed and wide range of the airplane, militarily guarded zones could be created before the coasts of all warfaring nations, and in respect to these zones one could no longer speak of freedom of the seas. Secondly, the introduction of electrical orientation equipment which made it possible, even at the beginning of the war, to spot an unseen opponent and to send fighting forces against him.